

# Perceived Biosecurity Needs in Southeast Asia

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute
Biosecurity in a Regional Context:
South and East Asia
April 14, 2004

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### Introduction

- Infectious disease is an international concern
- Biological weapons can have far-reaching impact and inflict extensive damage on humans, animals, and crops
  - Recent natural outbreaks demonstrate the potential impact
    - ◆ SARS: China and beyond 2002-2003, 8000 infected and ~ 800 dead
    - Foot and mouth disease: UK 2001, \$8 billion dollars lost
    - Avian influenza: Asia 2004, \$500 million in recovery costs, over 100 million fowl culled
    - Nipah virus: Malaysia 1999, 1.1 million pigs slaughtered, 115 human deaths










## **Global Biosecurity is Critical**

- Biosecurity measures in any one country are not sufficient
  - Proliferators will simply move to the locations with insufficient controls
- Only a small amount of material needs to be acquired for BW use
  - Bacteria and viruses can be amplified with commercially available equipment





## **General Motivations for Biosecurity**

- Increased regional terrorist activity may suggest that a country should pursue biosecurity
  - Assets could be at increased risk of theft and sabotage
  - Terrorists may be motivated by increasing ease and decreasing cost of producing and deploying a biological weapon and its potential impact
- Biosecurity has national benefits
  - Control of dangerous biological material
- Biosecurity implementation at a state or regional level would lead to increased international
  - Trust and transparency
  - Confidence among neighboring states
  - Influence international standards



## **SE Asia Biosecurity Motivators**

- Many outbreaks of infectious diseases
  - Result in many specimens of dangerous pathogens
- Growing biotechnology industry
  - Logical and cost effective to implement biosecurity for emerging bioscience activities
- Large agriculture sector that is potentially vulnerable to bioterrorism
  - ~25% GDP for India, Pakistan, Vietnam
  - ~12-18% GDP for Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia
  - 60% of Indian workforce associated with agriculture
- Increase in terrorist activity
  - Groups such as Abu Sayyaf, al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiah
  - Incidents such as Bali bombings, Malaysian anthrax scare, recent attempts in the Philippines for a Madrid style attack
- Some nations may present an opportunity to influence biosecurity for the region



## **Growing Asia Biotechnology Sector**

- Malaysia: Biovalley \$26 million investment
- Singapore: Biopolis Complex \$500 million investment
- India: Biotech industry expects 15% yearly growth rate
- Indonesia: Three Inter-University Centers on Biotechnology
- Pakistan: Biotechnology a top priority, especially agricultural
- Vietnam: Developing 6 national Biotech labs by 2006
- Philippines: Developing a Bachelor of Science in Biotechnology





**Biopolis Complex** 



## **Research Capacity**

- Many Southeast Asian countries have a large and talented scientific pool
- Numerous BSL-3 labs in the region
- India's National Institute of Biologicals
  - \$40 million to carry out research, clinical studies, and manufacturing
- Singapore's Biomedical Research Council
  - Funded at \$800 million per year



TB bacteria grown in BSL3 lab







## **Biological Assets**


- Endemic diseases provide numerous specimens
- Culture collections
  - Asia has 158 registered collections containing 241,949 cultures
    - ◆ India 15
    - Indonesia 16
    - ♦ Malaysia 5
    - ◆ Pakistan 2
    - ♦ Philippines 5
    - ♦ Singapore 2
    - ♦ Thailand 58
  - In comparison, the US has 19 registered collections





Avian influenza



## **Examples of Pathogens Endemic** to Asia and Regulated in the US









## **Conclusions and Future Directions**

- Southeast Asian countries have many reasons to be interested in pursuing biosecurity
- Individual nations should take responsibility for securing their dangerous pathogens and toxins
  - Scientists must be engaged in the development of biosecurity concepts
- Government support of biological R&D could be extended to aid implementation of biosecurity
- International biosecurity standards do not yet exist
  - Any efforts by SE Asia to implement biosecurity will influence the development of these standards
  - Biosecurity should be balanced with research needs





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## **Acknowledgements:**

Sandia Biosecurity Team: Ren Salerno, Natalie Barnett, Sue Rivera, Lauren Hickok, Daniel Estes, Susan Caskey, George Baldwin, John Milloy

www.biosecurity.sandia.gov

